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1 Introduction 
The concept of 'digital dividend' is well known: digitising analogue terrestrial television 
broadcasting makes possible to free up a sizeable quantity of spectrum for potentially 
new services. The importance of the digital dividend is obvious. Although the radio 
electric spectrum has always been a scarce resource, it seems to be even more so when 
the users' demand for access to contents and applications moves towards a scenario 
characterised by broadband and ubiquity. And when, as a consequence, companies 
require spectrum to commercially develop new generations of wireless/mobile 
communications with which to satisfy this pressing demand. 
Regulators around the world certainly have their eyes on this spectrum. 
Concrete plans for how to use the digital dividend are being drawn up or have been 
already setting up. The USA has led the way in freeing up and allocating the digital 
dividend spectrum. On 18 March 2008, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
completed the auction of 1099 licences in the 700 MHz band, imaginatively called 
'beachfront spectrum'. The FCC allowed the spectrum to be used on 'technology neutral 
grounds'. 
The list of countries that could make a similar decision will grow as the switchover 
from analogue to digital terrestrial television is completed. In Germany, the majority of 
funds raised from the spectrum auction that came to an end on 20 May 2010 were 
earmarked for 800 MHz frequency (digital dividend) licences. Some other European 
countries have already made public plans in this direction, with the UK (its regulator, 
Ofcom) being the one that seems to have progressed the most as regards the procedures 
prior to the auction. 
The exact calculation of how much spectrum could be auctioned depends on the 
particular digital broadcasting technology that is used and on the specific characteristics 
of the broadcast area. But, more important than the above, at the end of the day this is a 
political decision. Almost all governments that have already decided how to carry out the 
digital switchover have believed it appropriate to provide capacity for some additional 
broadcasting services. How much spectrum 'remains' for other uses or services is, 
therefore, more of a decision than a calculation. Undoubtedly, knowing how the results of 
a hypothetical auction would vary depending on the amount of spectrum available for 
allocation would be quite an interesting datum for any government considering what 
decision they should make. 
This is precisely the objective of this paper: it simulates three service-neutral digital 
dividend auctions considering three different amounts of spectrum. In view of the 
assumptions made in the model, it can be considered that the simulation is orientative for 
a major-type European country. However, the aim of the paper is not so much to obtain 
exact estimations of the results of the auction (something that is obviously quite 
complicated) as to compare the different modelled situations. Therefore, the generic 
conclusions can be valid for any other country. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents literature review on the three 
most important topics for the paper: the digital dividend itself, the services to which the 
dividend can be assigned and the use of auctions as the method to allocate spectrum. 
Section 3 globally describes the current situation of the analogue blackout and the 
decisions about the size of the digital dividend. Section 4 presents the methodology and 
the parameters of the model that have been used. Section 5 discusses the results obtained. 
The conclusions close the paper. 
2 Related work 
Three are the immediate questions that can be asked as regards the digital dividend: How 
much spectrum is (should be) freed-up as well as which services will be allocated to and 
how? 
2.1 About the size of the digital dividend 
The digital dividend is derived by the ability of digital compression systems to allow the 
transmission of several standard digital television channels in the spectrum previously 
used by one analogue channel while maintaining or improving quality of video and audio. 
Ofcom (2006) states that "digital broadcasting is roughly six times more efficient than 
analogue, allowing more channels to be carried across less spectrum". Given that 
television broadcasting in Europe occupies 392 MHz of the UHF band (channels 21-69; 
470-862 MHz), the dividend would exceed 300 MHz. 
Much more precise in its calculations is the report requested by the European 
Commission and published in April 2002 (BIPE Consulting, 2002). This study quantifies 
the digital dividend that would result from using the DVB-T standard for digital 
television without considering high-definition broadcasting. It is considered that five to 
ten 8 Hz channels are required to broadcast an analogue television programme throughout 
a whole country without any risk of interference. With digital transition, those 8 MHz 
that were previously occupied by one channel could be used for a 'multiplex' and, 
depending on the assumptions made for the transmission and the reception, 3-15 
channels would be required for national coverage. Operating with these parameters, the 
dividend would fluctuate between 272 MHz and 368 MHz. 
Although old, this calculation seems to maintain its validity since in the much more 
recent report that the European Commission has requested for preparing their 
recommendation on the digital dividend (Analysys Mason et al., 2009), the theoretical 
dividend is still estimated in around 320 MHz. Despite the above, it must be noted that 
the gain will be even more substantive if more advanced standards are introduced (such 
as DVB-T2 for infrastructure and MPEG-4 for compression) or if further spectrum 
efficiency gains are achieved. 
Television channel frequencies are different in other geographical areas, but in most 
countries, analogue television occupies (occupied) amounts of around 400 MHz of the 
UHF band, making the calculation of the theoretical dividend comparable in very broad 
terms with that of the European countries. 
However, as stated in the introduction, the answer to this first question has a political 
side as important as the technical side. Almost all governments are reserving part of the 
theoretical digital dividend spectrum to provide capacity for additional broadcasting 
services. Section 3 gives a global overview of the decisions made regarding how much 
spectrum is being freed-up. 
2.2 About the possible uses of the digital dividend 
Almost all service and application providers using the radio electric spectrum would be 
interested in participating in the sharing out of this 'newly available' spectrum. 
The digital dividend spectrum fall within the UHF band, which, as regards other 
frequencies, presents a series of characteristics that provide an appealing balance between 
distance coverage and transmission capability. Additionally, the low signal attenuation in 
the presence of obstacles guarantees adequate coverage inside buildings without the need 
for additional equipment, thus minimising the infrastructure costs required for 
deployment. 
Therefore, the list of possible services the digital dividend could be allocated to is 
long: digital terrestrial television, mobile multimedia, mobile communications, low 
power device-related services such as medical telemetry, Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) or Near Field Communications (NFCs); non-commercial services such as 
defence, security, emergencies or other public services, or even services yet to be fully 
developed. 
It should not be forgotten that, as pointed out in the introduction, companies require 
spectrum to commercially develop new or improved mobile services that consumers 
value and are willing to pay for (refer to interesting case studies in Liu et al. (2008) and 
Chong et al. (2010)). Particularly, mobile broadband is proving popular with both 
business and residential users and it will become increasingly popular as diffusion 
barriers are gradually overcome (Karaiskos et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2009). 
2. 3 About the method to allocate the digital dividend spectrum 
As regards how the spectrum should be allocated, the decision regarding the dividend 
appears in a time of change as regards radio electric spectrum management (Feijóo et al., 
2009). A current of opinion favourable to the introduction of market economy criteria 
seems to be consolidating (Bykowsky et al., 2010). One of the key aspects of this reform 
is precisely the use of auctions as the preferred licence-allocation mechanism. 
The usage of auctions is, however, not at all unknown in the sector. Licences have 
been auctioned for years and in a great deal of countries. However, there was a point of 
inflection in the consideration of auctions as a spectrum-allocation mechanism. During 
2000 and 2001, several European countries auctioned third generation (3G or UMTS) 
mobile-communications licences (see an analysis in Melody (2001)). The amount 
reached by the bids even led the spectrum auctions to make the headlines in the media. 
Since then, researches on auctions started proliferating, attempting to reach the optimum 
allocation mechanisms for the spectrum in terms of efficiency as well as of revenue 
maximisation (Banks et al., 2003; Plot and Salmon, 2004; Bajari and Yeo, 2009; 
Wang and Barnes, 2009). Failures and successes of the recent FCC's 700 MHz auction 
have already been analysed ex-post (Bazelon, 2009). 
3 The size of the digital dividend in practice 
The USA switched off analogue TV on 12 June 2009. The digital dividend released was 
of 108 MHz in the 698-806 MHz band (the "700 MHz band"). 24 MHz of this spectrum 
were set aside for public safety systems, and 22 MHz had been auctioned to allow new 
commercial uses such as mobile television (auctions 44 and 49). Through the famous 
"auction 73", the FCC auctioned the remaining 62 MHz, beginning on 24 January 2008 
and ending on 18 March 2008. Auction 73 offered a total of 1099 licences sold in five 
blocks: block A and B - 2 x 6 MHz; block C - 2 x 11 MHz; block D - 2 x 5 MHz; block 
E - 6 MHz unpaired. 
Initially, the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial TV has to be completed 
in Europe by the end of 2012. Within this deadline, each country is following a different 
pace towards the switchover and a different approach to the dividend. 'Group A' 
countries have already completed the switchoff: Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the region of Flanders in Belgium. The Group B, which has 
the switchoff date at end-2010 or earlier, includes Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Malta, 
Slovenia and Spain. The rest ('Group C ) aims at the period between end-2010 and 
end-2012. Only Poland has been given a farther switchoff deadline, i.e., 2015 at the 
latest. 
In October 2009, the Commission adopted a Recommendation in which asks EU 
Member States to speed up the switchoff of analogue TV (to complete it by 1 January 
2012) and to set aside one part of the freed-up spectrum, namely the 790-862 MHz 
sub-band, to support the emergence of new wireless services. Germany became the first 
country to follow the recommendation. In May 2010, spectrum in several frequency 
bands (800 MHz, 1.8 GHz, 2 GHz and 2.6 GHz) was auctioned; it was airwaves in the 
digital dividend band ( 6 x 5 MHz paired blocks in the 791-821 MHz and 832-862 MHz) 
that was most sought after and commanded the highest fees. Several other Member States 
have already announced plans for the digital dividend. In the UK, 112 MHz is being 
earmarked for open auctions. Sweden had earmarked 152 MHz for opening up but 
stepped back to re-allocate only 72 MHz in the first wave. France has advanced plans 
similar to those in Sweden. 
Japan's switchover is planned for July 2011. In Japan, 60 MHz of UHF spectrum 
(710-770 MHz) have already been earmarked for re-allocation. This spectrum may be 
awarded by technology-neutral auctions. 
South Korea has planned the switchoff of analogue television for end-2012. This will 
initially free up the 54 MHz between 752 and 806 MHz. The future use of this spectrum 
has yet to be decided. 
Australia has released, in January 2010, a Digital dividend Green Paper. Analogue 
television transmission will be progressively turned off from 2010 with a complete 
switchover to digital television transmission by December 2013. The Green Paper 
proposes a dividend of 126 MHz, most likely at 694-820 MHz. 
Other countries are still at an earlier stage in planning digital switchover: 
New Zealand's switchover date remains vague, sometime between 2013 and 2015; 
China, India and Russia target 2015; Brazil, mid-2016. Consequently, they have not yet 
identified exactly how much spectrum, if any, will be released. 
4 Characteristics of the model 
4.1 Methodology 
The model aims to simulate a digital dividend auction that could fit in a major-type 
European country. It was set up as described in the following subsections. Once defined 
the model, an efficient simulator for combinatorial first-price sealed bid auctions has 
been implemented. Each of the scenarios has been run 100 times. 
The main computational challenge that the simulator must solve is the winner 
determination problem. Combinatorial auctions have an intrinsic computational problem: 
finding a feasible combination of bids, which maximises the auctioneer's revenue, i.e., 
solving the winner determination problem. As the number of bids, bidders and items 
increases, the problem becomes more complex. In this model, to work out the winner 
determination problem, an A* search algorithm (Hart et al., 1968) has been developed. 
The A* tree representation used is based on a Branch On Bids (BOB) formulation with a 
simple but efficient heuristic function based on revenues (for a further understanding of 
this algorithm, see Sáez et al. (2008)). 
Other prior research has simulated bidding behaviour in auctions (Stone et al., 2003; 
Reeves et al., 2005; Avenali and Bassanini, 2007). However, these works are aimed at 
assessing particular tools or techniques and not at predicting results of real auctions. 
As far as we know, this work is the first attempt to simulate a spectrum auction under 
modelled conditions as real as possible. 
4.2 Spectrum to be auctioned 
Considering the different sizes of digital dividends around the world, three different 
scenarios have been defined: digital dividend is 48 MHz, 80 MHz or 120 MHz. This 
spectrum is divided into lots of 8 MHz each. That means 6, 10 or 15 lots to be auctioned. 
The division into 8 MHz channels has two reasons: 
• it is the size of the existing television channels in Europe and, therefore, simplifies 
spectrum management and equipment operation 
• the Geneva-06 Agreement allocated the digital dividend spectrum in 8 MHz channels 
across Europe for other uses compatible with digital broadcasting. 
Service and technology neutrality has been chosen as the main constituent of the auction 
and, as a consequence, the lots are not preallocated to any service. 
The licences are awarded for national coverage. It is more spectrally efficient, in 
general, to allocate spectrum across the country as a whole rather than at a more granular 
level (it avoids the need for additional frequencies for potentially interfering services). 
Additionally, it is more realistic to think that the participants in an auction will be 
interested in providing national services (except for local or regional television, which it 
is not considered in the model). 
4.3 Type of auction 
A combinatorial first-price sealed bid auction without reserve price will be used. For this 
auction format, bidders are allowed to submit in one single round as many bids as they 
wish for any combination of available lots. Then, the auctioneer determines the 
combination of feasible bids that maximises the revenues, i.e., solves the so-called winner 
determination problem. After that, winners have to pay what they bid for the awarded 
items. 
In this way, combinatorial auctions solve the so-called 'aggregation risk' (or 
'exposure problem'), which participants face when every licence is sold separately (be it 
in sequence or simultaneously) and the 'necessary minimum' number of lots is not won. 
Combinatorial auctions are then particularly appropriate if there are strong 
complementarities between licences (synergies) as well as substitution possibilities 
(see Cramton, 2007). Moreover, this auction model is fast, transparent and not prone to 
the appearance of collusion among the participants. 
To simplify the calculations, we consider that the auctionable goods are completely 
homogeneous, which is approximately true in this case (frequencies are close enough to 
consider that the lots are close substitutes). We also consider that the valuations are equal 
regardless of the lots being contiguous or not. This generic approach is used in real 
auctions as it simplifies the process for bidders, who only have to express the number of 
lots they want at a particular price. The seller can then organise a follow-up process to 
actually allocate spectrum in such a way that, for example, as much contiguous spectrum 
as possible can be guaranteed. 
4.4 Agents participating in the auction 
As stated in Section 2.2, the list of possible services the digital dividend could be 
allocated to is long. However, in a commercial auction such as the one to be simulated 
(with licences awarded for a national coverage and 8 MHz lots), only the three first 
mentioned services could have actual possibilities of obtaining spectrum: 
• additional digital television channels (standard or high definition) 
• multimedia services (interactive television, on-demand video, music, radio) for 
mobile devices 
• mobile communications (voice transmission and broadband connection for data 
transmission). 
As a consequence, the participation in the auction is restricted to companies 
interested in operating in these markets. We establish a total of 15 participants in the 
auction: eight previously present in any of these markets and seven newcomers. 
Their characteristics are described here: 
• Digital television broadcasters (four). 
Their interest is to obtain more spectrum for broadcasting new digital television 
channels, be they standard (DTT-SD) or high definition (DTT-HD) (and in one 
of the cases, both types simultaneously). Additionally, one of these companies is 
attempting to also enter the mobile multimedia market (Mob MMedia). 
• Mobile communications operators (four). 
We consider two possibilities: two agents already hold spectrum in the 900 MHz 
band (they are the current holders of the first GSM licences awarded) and the 
other two do not have any spectrum in this band (they have accessed the market 
more recently). 
Since the four of them are already present in the market, we assume that the 
additional spectrum would be allocated both to voice and data services 
(Mob Comm Voice + Data), although we suppose that one of the agents is 
particularly interested in strengthening their mobile broadband access 
(Mob Comm Data centric). Additionally, two of these companies are interested 
in including also multimedia services (Mob MMedia) as a part of their offer. 
• Newcomers (seven). 
We consider that they only compete for entering into one of the aforementioned 
markets. 
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of these participants in the auction. In the "Level 
of confidence" column, there are three possibilities (low-medium-high), which 
correspond with the perception of the possible profitability that the awarded spectrum 
would provide. The following section explains this in further detail. Likewise, that same 
section explains the contents of the 'Lots required' column. 
Table 1 Agents participating in the auction 
Company 
Bl 
B2 TV 
Target market 
DTT - SD 
DTT-HD 
B 3 broadcasters D T T - SD/DTT - HD 
B4 
B5 
B6 
Mobile 
"' operators 
B8 
B9 
BIO 
Bl l 
B 1 2 N e t W t entrants 
B13 
B14 
B15 
DTT - SD/Mob Mmedia 
Mob Comm (Voice + Data) 
Mob Comm (Voice + Data)/Mob 
Mob Comm (Voice + Data)/Mob 
Mob Comm (Voice + Data)/Mob 
(Data centric) 
DTT - SD 
DTT-HD 
Mob Comm (Voice + Data) 
Mob Comm (Data centric) 
Mob Comm (Data centric) 
Mob Mmedia 
Mob Mmedia 
MMedia 
MMedia 
Comm 
Level of confidence 
Medium 
Medium 
Low/Low 
Low/Medium 
Low 
Low/Medium 
High/Low 
High/Low 
High 
High 
High 
Medium 
High 
Low 
High 
Lots required 
3-12 
3-15 
3-15 
1-15 
1-8 
1-14 
1-14 
1-15 
3-12 
3-15 
1-8 
1-8 
1-8 
1-6 
1-6 
4.5 Spectrum assessments carried out by the bidders 
In the Ofcom document that consults on the proposed approach to the awarding of the 
digital dividend spectrum (Ofcom, 2006), there are assessments on the value that a 
certain additional fraction of spectrum could have for different services. These figures 
have been obtained as a result of a model that intends to identify the incremental 
producer and consumer value, which is generated by using the available UHF spectrum 
compared with other alternatives (other spectrum bands or delivery platforms). What is 
provided is the private value: the sum of industry producer surplus (profits) and consumer 
surplus (individual's willingness to pay in excess of the market price). The model was 
refined and actualised in Ofcom (2007). See details in Annex I. 
As said earlier, the difficulties of an analysis of this nature are obvious. Ofcom itself 
assumes the limitations of the calculations: 
"the high level of uncertainty and the complexity of some of the 
inter-relationships between services mean that this type of modelling can at 
best provide an order of magnitude assessment of value." 
It is also obvious that none of the figures quoted in the document can be taken directly as 
an indication of auction proceeds. However, after being submitted to certain adaptations, 
they are valid for their use in a simulation exercise as the one we intend to perform. 
The adaptations carried out to transform them into spectrum valuations (valuations, not 
bids) by the participating companies are as follows: 
• The total surplus is divided in equal share (50/50) between consumers and 
producers. 
• For each service, Ofcom designs two scenarios: high and low value scenario. In our 
model, it translates into the maximum (a) and minimum (b) of the valuations 
bracket. 
Within this bracket, three intervals are designed, which would correspond to 
different assessments (or confidence levels as regards the future profitability) 
carried out by the agents: low [a; (a + b)/2]; medium [(3a + b)/4; (a + 3b)/4]; 
high [(a + b)/2; b]. Note therefore that the valuation of each agent is no longer 
a single value but that it can take any value within one of the above-mentioned 
intervals. 
* Medium • 
a b 
< Low • « High • 
• The valuations given refer to an optimum amount of spectrum, which is specified 
in (or can be deduced from) the scenarios designed for each service by Ofcom. 
For each agent, this will be the optimal amount of lots they compete for. Higher 
or lower amounts are 'corrected' by a coefficient, which is higher the further away 
it is from the optimal value (refer to Annex I). In economic terms, this means 
that complementary and substitution effects between lots simultaneously exist. 
Goods are substitutes (subadditive values) if earning one item reduces the value 
of earning more items; goods are complements (superadditive values or synergies) 
if already having one item increases the value of awarding another one 
(Ausubel et al , 1997). Additionally, for some services there exists a minimum 
amount of lots (the service cannot be provided with less lots) or a maximum amount 
of lots (additional lots would be unnecessary under the current market conditions). 
4.6 Bids submitted by the bidders 
To move from valuations to actual bids, two additional steps are required. First, the 
exact value given by each participant is determined in each experiment by fitting a 
Gaussian distribution to the valuation interval. This value is the maximum players should 
be willing to bid in an auction. The second step is to select a 'strategy' for the bid. 
This is done selecting a value between 0 and 1, again using a Gaussian distribution, 
for each agent and experiment. The final bid is then calculated as the product of the value 
and the strategy selected. 
5 Results of the experiments 
Annex II provides a comprehensive perspective of the results. 
Table 2 provides a comparison of the seller income in each of the three scenarios 
(as an average of the 100 experiments). It can be observed that the average income per lot 
is higher the smaller the number of lots (17% more in the 6 lots case when compared with 
the 15 lots). However, the differences between scenarios B and C (10 and 15 lots) are not 
too big. 
Table 2 Seller's average income (€M) 
Scenario 
A 
B 
C 
MHz 
48 
80 
120 
Lots 
6 
10 
15 
Total 
904.6 
1343.7 
1927.6 
Total 
Per lot 
150.8 
134.4 
128.5 
Table 3 shows (in percentage) the sharing out of the spectrum auctioned among the 
participants and what payment is associated to receiving said spectrum. The first 
observation that can be made is that four of the bidders (Bl, B3, B5 and B9) do not 
obtain spectrum in any of the 300 experiments (100 per scenario). This fact, added to the 
scarce weight of the B2 and B10 bidders, can lead to the conclusion that the agents 
coming from the "television environment" do not have many possibilities in the auction 
as opposed to those coming from the "mobile environment". The exception is bidder B4, 
although in this case, their result is explained by their intention of entering the mobile 
multimedia market and of valuing the spectrum accordingly. 
Table 3 Lots won and payment required - per bidder (aggregated results from 100 repetitions) 
Scenario 
A Lots 
Payment 
B Lots 
Payment 
C Lots 
Payment 
B2 
(%) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.3 
B4 
(%) 
21.5 
21.1 
19.4 
20.3 
14.4 
15.8 
B6 
(%) 
22.3 
22.3 
16.5 
17.0 
16.3 
17.4 
B7 
(%) 
5.7 
4.2 
7.5 
6.1 
9.7 
8.4 
B8 
(%) 
1.5 
0.9 
3.7 
2.3 
4.7 
3.5 
B10 
(%) 
0 
0 
1.3 
0.8 
2.9 
2.2 
Bll 
(%) 
0.8 
0.5 
2.6 
1.6 
3.5 
2.5 
B12 
(%) 
1.2 
0.8 
4.3 
3.4 
5.9 
4.8 
BIS 
(%) 
8.2 
6.4 
9.8 
8.5 
13.7 
12.3 
B14 
(%) 
3.7 
2.6 
7.3 
6.1 
7.1 
5.7 
B15 
(%) 
35.2 
41.3 
27.6 
33.9 
21.4 
27.1 
Built upon the results of Table 3, Figure 1 shows more clearly the evolution of the results 
as regards the number of lots won. It can be observed that the spectrum is increasingly 
shared out among the different bidders the greater the amount of spectrum is offered. 
Thus, in Scenario A (auction of 6 lots), three bidders (4, 6 and 15) win almost 80% of the 
lots. Their weight decreases in the other scenarios and in the case of Scenario C (15 lots) 
they only exceed slightly 50%, despite the average price paid per lot by these three strong 
bidders is still greater than that paid by the remaining bidders that obtain spectrum. 
Figure 1 Lots won - Per bidder (aggregated results from 100 repetitions) (see online version 
for colours) 
15% 
ia% 
25K 
20% 
15K 
13% 
B2 B4 B6 B7 B8 B10 Bl l B12 B13 B14 B15 
• 15 lots n io lots l 6 lots 
Horizontal axis shows bidder identifier (from B1-B15) - Refer to Table 1. 
Vertical axis is the percentage distribution of lots. 
It must also be noted that in scenario A (six lots), the results are less certain both for the 
auctioneer and for the bidders. Indeed, the standard deviation of the auction income 
represents, in this case, 15.6% of the average (for 12.7% in scenario B and 11.3% in 
scenario C) while the minimum income obtained in the 100 experiments represents 
58.7% of the average (as opposed to 69.4% and 68%, respectively). As regards the 
participants in the auction, we can take the case of bidder 15 (strongest bidder) 
as an example. Annex II shows that the number of times that bidder 15 wins zero lots 
in scenario A is 27 (across 100 experiments) and in 5 occasions they obtain a single lot. 
In scenario B, these figures are 17 and 3; in C, 13 and 0. 
6 Conclusions 
A rational assignment and an efficient use of radio spectrum have become sine qua non 
condition for the ICT sector development. Moreover, the consequences of the decisions 
about spectrum planning and management go beyond the sector. The innovation 
introduced in ICT markets regarding new services and applications hugely depends on 
the evolution of wireless technologies, which is reliant on the availability of spectrum. 
The knock-on effects, undoubtedly, will affect general users and, particularly, business 
organisations for which communications services are becoming a key strategic asset, no 
matter the particular sector of economic activity. 
In this sense, the allocation of the digital dividend is one of the most relevant events 
among those that will have a global impact on the whole ICT sector in the near future. 
The value of the UHF band and the potentially high number of licences and interested 
bidders are proof of this. Therefore, what is at stake is of no little importance. Without 
ignoring television, the decision can condition a country's development of B3G or 4G 
technologies (and, therefore, the availability of ubiquitous broadband connectivity), what 
could position it in a situation of disadvantage against whatever neighbours may have 
chosen a dividend allocation more favourable to innovation. 
Governments seem to become increasingly aware of this fact and, as time goes by, 
there is a stronger inclination to free-up a part of the dividend for services other than 
television. As an example, that of some European countries (Spain), which, having 
initially reserved all the UHF spectrum for television channels and not expecting to 
obtain any dividend, are now aligning themselves with the Commission's proposal of 
freeing-up the '800 MHz band'. 
This fact, added to the progressive replacement of the beauty contest with the 
auction as the preferred spectrum-allocation method, will result in the number of 
spectrum auctions undoubtedly increasing in the next years. Therefore, knowing how 
these auctions operate will be essential both for the industry's agents (and quite 
specifically, for mobile communication companies) and for governments. Academic 
research should contribute to this mission and this has been the main motivation for this 
work. 
In this context, the simulation of a digital dividend auction with different sizes of 
digital dividend becomes a highly interesting first issue. The amount fixed for the 
dividend in different countries throughout the world is contained in a range that covers 
approximately from 50 MHz to 120 MHz. As a consequence, three different scenarios 
using the extreme values of the bracket as well as a central one (48 MHz, 80 MHz and 
120 MHz) have been simulated. 
The results show, as was to be expected, that the income per lot is maximised when 
the spectrum is scarcer. Additionally, and also logically, the sale of a greater amount 
of spectrum provides for a greater sharing out of the lots among the different bidders. 
It should be noted that, even in the scenario where the greater amount of spectrum 
is auctioned, television operators hardly win any lot. This implies that reserving a portion 
of the spectrum in the auction (spectrum caps) in favour of mobile communications 
would not change the results significantly, being those results quite similar to those 
of a service-neutral auction. A different matter would be if the spectrum caps where 
imposed to favour specific technological options or particular mobile services or 
applications. These research findings cannot be compared with those of other 
investigators as no similar studies have been found. 
The present research has limitations and also possibilities of extension. Obviously, 
the specific numerical results depend on the allocated valuations, which, although 
based on a solid Ofcom report, would depend, in a real auction, on the specific conditions 
of the country, the market situation and the general economic climate at the time. 
Concerning other lines of research, it would be interesting to assess what the case would 
be should some of the agents use strategies in the auction such as 'market closure', trying 
to monopolise all the spectrum they could to reduce the chances for competitors. It would 
also be useful to know how the results change when the dividend is sold in two auctions 
separated in time (for example, as the appropriate channels are actually freed-up) instead 
of just a single auction. 
Despite the above, the conclusions obtained seem relevant for anticipating some 
of the results of what will become the usual practice of the telecommunications industry 
during the next years. A usual practice, let us not forget it, extremely relevant for the 
future of mobile communications and the overall economy. 
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Annex I 
Definition of the services considered for spectrum valuations: 
• DTT-SD: Companies interested in launching a new multiplex dedicated to additional 
standard definition digital television services. 
• DTT-HD: Same, but high definition services. 
• Mobile multimedia: Companies interested in delivering a range of services to 
handheld devices. These could include data, music and services such as 
mobile TV. 
• Mobile data centric: Companies interested in rolling out a broadband service using a 
newer technology (e.g. variants of the already used 3G standards, mobile WiMAX or 
even LTE or mobile ultrabroadband). 
• Mobile voice and data: Companies interested in acquiring spectrum to augment 
current 3G services that focus on both voice and data. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the main characteristics of the Ofcom scenarios from which the 
bidders' values intervals are derived. 
Table 4 Overview of the DTT economic modelling 
Scenarios Low value 
Ofcom value (£bn) 0.5 
(producer + consumer 
value) 
Number of agents 1 
Spectrum acquired 1 multiplex 
DTT-SD 
High value 
3 
2 
2 multiplex 
DTT-HD 
Low value 
1 
1 
1 multiplex 
Main characteristics Low demand for High demand for Low value of 
incremental incremental channels HD channels 
channels 
'Adapted' value (€M) Min 
185 
Max 
556 
Min 
371 
High value 
3.5 
2 
2 multiplex 
High demand for 
HD channels 
Max 
649 
Table 5 Overview of the mobile economic modelling 
Scenarios 
Ofcom value 
(£bn) (producer 
+ consumer 
value) 
Number of agents 
Spectrum 
required 
Main 
characteristics 
'Adapted' value 
(€M) 
Mobile multimedia 
Low value 
0.3 
: 2 
24 mobile 
TV 
channels 
Niche 
market. 
Urban 
areas 
Min 
56 
High value 
3 
2 
24 mobile 
TV channels 
High 
demand. 
Some 
adoption 
delay 
Max 
556 
Mobile - voice and data 
Low value 
0.5 
3 
10MHz 
Operators 
possess 
some 
900 MHz 
spectrum 
Min 
62 
High value 
2 
3 
10MHz 
First low 
frequency 
spectrum 
(below 
1GHz) 
Max 
247 
Mobile - data centric 
Low value 
1 
2 
24 MHz 
Moderate 
demand. 
Incumbents. 
Available sites 
Min 
185 
High value 
2.5 
2 
24 MHz 
High 
demand. 
New 
entrants. 
No sites 
Max 
463 
Table 6 present complement and substitution effects between lots and the resultant 
coefficient factor that multiplies values obtained for the optimum number of lots. 
Table 6 Complement and substitution effects between lots and multiplication coefficients 
DTT-SD 
Number Value of Multipl. 
of lots the lot coeff. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
0.40 
0.65 
0.85 
1.00 
0.90 
0.80 
0.65 
0.50 
0.35 
0.20 
0.200 
0.433 
0.708 
1.000 
1.150 
1.283 
1.392 
1.475 
1.533 
1.567 
DTT-SD 
Value of Multipl. 
the lot coeff. 
0.25 
0.50 
0.75 
1.00 
0.95 
0.90 
0.85 
0.75 
0.65 
0.55 
0.40 
0.25 
0.10 
0.125 
0.333 
0.625 
1.000 
1.158 
1.308 
1.450 
1.575 
1.683 
1.775 
1.842 
1.883 
1.900 
Mobile 
multimedia 
Value of Multipl. 
the lot coeff. 
0.75 
1.00 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
0.375 
1.000 
1.400 
1.700 
1.900 
2.000 
Mobile - voice 
and data 
Value of Multipl. 
the lot coeff. 
0.80 
1.00 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
0.10 
0.05 
0.400 
1.000 
1.400 
1.700 
1.900 
2.000 
2.050 
2.075 
Mobile - data 
centric 
Value of Multipl. 
the lot coeff. 
0.50 
0.75 
1.00 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.50 
0.25 
0.167 
0.500 
1.000 
1.300 
1.567 
1.800 
1.967 
2.050 
Annex II 
Scenario A (6 lots) 
Frequency of lots earned by each bidder 
Bl 
0 100 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0 
100 
Price paid 
Mean 
B2 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B3 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
. per lot (€M) 
Stand, dev. 
Max 
Min 
Seller's income 
Mean 
Stand, dev. 
Max 
Min 
B4 
144.0 
30.4 
188.4 
68.0 
:(€M) 
B4 B5 
45 100 
7 
30 
11 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 100 
B6 
146.8 
26.7 
188.6 
68.8 
B6 
44 
8 
24 
19 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B7 
108.4 
15.0 
133.4 
73.7 
B7 B8 
83 93 
6 5 
9 2 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
100 100 
B8 
84.3 
16.7 
109.1 
54.2 
Total 
904.6 
141.0 
1188.9 
530.9 
B9 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
Bll 
BIO 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
76.62 
30.1 
109.8 
44.5 
1
 Bll 
96 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B12 
105.6 
14.4 
115.8 
95.4 
B12 
98 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B13 
117.3 
14.1 
135.1 
81.1 
BU B14 
87 88 
0 4 
0 6 
5 2 
7 0 
0 0 
1 0 
0 0 
0 0 
100 100 
B14 
103.7 
16.4 
129.7 
79.2 
Per lot 
150.8 
23.5 
198.1 
88.5 
B15 
27 
5 
24 
22 
19 
2 
1 
0 
0 
100 
B15 
173.3 
37.1 
231.1 
63.5 
Scenario B (10 lots) 
Frequency of lots earned by each bidder 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Bl 
100 
0 
0 
0 
B2 
100 
0 
0 
0 
B3 
100 
0 
0 
0 
B4 
32 
3 
27 
20 
B5 
100 
0 
0 
0 
B6 
38 
4 
24 
23 
B7 
64 
8 
21 
3 
B8 
78 
11 
8 
2 
B9 
100 
0 
0 
0 
B10 
98 
0 
0 
0 
Bll 
84 
10 
3 
2 
B12 
87 
0 
0 
10 
BU 
73 
0 
1 
13 
B14 
68 
5 
17 
6 
B15 
17 
3 
13 
31 
Frequency of lots earned by each bidder (continued) 
Bl 
4 0 
5 0 
6 0 
7 0 
8 0 
100 
Price paid 
B2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
per lot (€M) 
B4 
B4 
13 
5 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B6 
B5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B7 
B6 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B7 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B8 
B8 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
Bit 
B9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
) 
BIO 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
100 
Bll 
Bll 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B12 
B12 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B13 
10 
1 
2 
0 
0 
100 
BIS 
B14 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B14 
B15 
27 
8 
1 
0 
0 
100 
B15 
Mean 139.7 137.1 105.5 80.5 84.1 79.2 106.8 114.9 109.7 160.3 
Stand, dev. 26.4 29.8 19.8 12.7 1.7 13.1 8.9 13.3 19.3 38.2 
Max 185.2 191.7 136.1 102.2 85.3 102.1 116.9 134.9 137.3 230.4 
Min 64.0 56.7 51.0 62.2 83.0 56.0 92.6 92.9 65.0 45.7 
Seller's income (€M) 
Total Per lot 
Mean 
Stand, dev. 
Max 
Min 
1343.7 
171.2 
1725.4 
932.5 
134.4 
17.1 
172.5 
93.3 
Scenario C (15 lots) 
Frequency of lots earned by each bidder 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Bl 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B2 
99 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
100 
B3 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B4 
32 
1 
15 
27 
21 
4 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B5 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B6 
20 
1 
25 
30 
19 
3 
2 
0 
0 
100 
B7 
52 
1 
21 
12 
6 
6 
2 
0 
0 
100 
B8 
74 
5 
10 
5 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B9 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B10 
93 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
1 
100 
Bll 
76 
2 
16 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B12 
76 
0 
0 
12 
8 
3 
1 
0 
0 
100 
B13 
47 
0 
0 
25 
18 
4 
3 
3 
0 
100 
B14 
55 
4 
27 
9 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
100 
B15 
13 
0 
13 
20 
37 
15 
2 
0 
0 
100 
Price paid per lot (€M) 
B2 B4 B6 B7 B8 BIO Bll B12 B13 B14 B15 
Mean 78.4 139.2 137.0 109.8 91.5 
Stand, dev. 25.3 28.1 14.2 29.1 
Max 78.4 185.6 191.7 136.7 107.2 
Min 78.4 67.1 63.8 74.2 51.7 
Seller's income (€M) 
94.5 
3.9 
97.3 
86.2 
92.2 
30.1 
109.8 
44.5 
104.5 
10.3 
117.5 
70.5 
114.8 
31.1 
136.5 
87.5 
101.9 
18.1 
135.1 
57.6 
159.2 
32.1 
211.9 
97.2 
Total Per lot 
Mean 1927.6 128.5 
Stand, dev. 215.8 14.5 
Max 2473.6 164.9 
Min 1310.5 87.4 
